

THE POLITICAL DYNASTY AND LOCAL STRONGMEN HEGEMONY AT LOCAL ELECTION OF 2020

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Abstract. This paper aims to analyze of phenomena political dynasti and local strongmen hegemony at Local election of 2020. How the political dynasty and local strongman hegemony at local election of 2020 are the question of this research. This research used theory of political dynasty, recruitment politic and local strongmen with adopted qualitative research methodology. The main method used in this research are literature study to obtain the objective results. The results of this research are: The first, political dynasty at local election of 2020 is caused by permissive impression of voters in Indonesia about political dynasty phenomena, in other that local strongmen hegemonic and political recruitment procedure of political party played an important role in improving of dynastic politic.

Keywords: *Local election, Local strongmen, Hegemony*

1. INTRODUCTION

Local election is one of the products of democratic development after the collapse of the new order regime. Initially, Governors, Regents, and Mayors and their representatives were elected indirectly by members of the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD), but after the collapse of the Suharto regime in 1998, which was followed by the democratization process in Indonesia, the process of selecting regional heads became directly elected by the government. people. The first direct elections were held in 2005, this is as regulated in Law Number 32 of 2004 concerning Regional Government. Since then, local people have had the opportunity to determine their own regional head.

The high political costs caused by the implementation of local election are associated with the rampant corruption cases committed by regional heads. Not only that, the emergence of petty kings and the hegemony of dynastic politics in the regions are also considered a bad impact on the implementation of local election. Based on these factors, the DPR RI in 2014 passed Law Number 23 of 2014 concerning Regional Government, one of which stated that the Regional Head Elections were no longer elected by the people but were re-elected by the DPRD. The law then reaped various pros and cons among the public, until finally President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono issued Perppu Number 1 of 2014 which directly removed the DPRD's authority to elect regional heads. In addition, the president also issued Perppu Number 2 of 2014 concerning Regional Government, which was later enacted as Law Number 1 of 2015 and Law Number 8 of 2015 concerning local election. Since the issuance of this law, regional head elections

will continue to be carried out directly by being elected by the people. However, for the sake of efficiency in the state budget, the direct elections will be carried out simultaneously in several waves. The first batch of regional elections was held in 2015, then the second wave in 2017, the third wave in 2018, and the fourth wave in 2020.

Even though it has been fifteen years carrying out local election with thousands of contestations for the implementation of local election, in practice the implementation of local election still encounters various problems, one of which is the emergence of the phenomenon of dynastic politics in local election. In the 2020 local election, there are at least 124 candidates who have kinship with the ruler or dynastic politics. This number has increased when compared to the previous elections. The widespread practice of dynastic politics in the local election is also allegedly due to the increasing number of local strongmen in the regions who want to hegemony in power. Based on the description of the problem, this study will discuss the phenomenon of dynastic politics and the hegemony of local strongmen in the implementation of the 2020 local election.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Political Recruitment

One of the functions of political parties is to carry out the function of political recruitment. Recruitment is a selection process carried out by political parties to place their cadres in political positions. Political recruitment is very important to maintain the stability of political parties and determine the fate of political parties in the future. The most important aspect of political recruitment is the selection of candidates. It is this candidate selection mechanism that has led to various polemics. In candidate selection, political parties are required to not only prioritize the popularity and electability of candidates as a place for vote getters, but also to prioritize the capabilities and qualities of candidates.

Based on the pattern of recruitment, Gabriel Almond and Powell distinguish the pattern of candidate recruitment into two forms, namely open recruitment and closed recruitment.¹ Open recruitment has terms and procedures in presenting someone so that it can be widely known. This method is considered very competitive, because it provides an opportunity for the public to see and assess the capabilities of the political elite. While political recruitment is closed, the terms and procedures for nomination cannot be freely known in general. This method is also considered as a way to block or close the opportunity for the wider community to see and display the capabilities of the political elite.

Meanwhile, Barbara Geddes distinguishes four recruitment models, namely partisanship, which is a political party that considers a person's loyalty to a political party. Furthermore, meritocratic, namely political recruitment from people who have high potential. The third recruitment model is compartmentalization, namely political recruitment based on pragmatic considerations, and the fourth model is survival, namely political recruitment based on the principle of remuneration and applicant resources and tends to be patronage.²

The use of political recruitment theory in this study is used to analyze how the

¹ Gabriel Almond and Powell, *Comparative politic: A Development approach*, Bombay ; Feffer and Simmons Private, 1966, p 79.

² Barbara Geddes, *Politician Dilema : Building state capacity in Latin America*, University of California Press, 1966 P 142-181.

mechanism of nomination is carried out by political parties in the 2020 local election. This approach will also answer the dynamics of nominations carried out by political parties which actually display dynastic political practices in the 2020 Local election.

2.2 Bossism and Local Strongmen

One of the impacts of local election is the emergence of local strongmen and regional bossism. According to Migdal, local strongmen carry out various strategies to survive, expand and maintain power by forming an accommodation triangle with state bureaucrats and politicians at the local level.³ The emergence of local strongmen or local strongmen is motivated by the emergence of organizations or community groups that are independent and autonomous apart from state domination. This shows that the state has weak control over society thus allowing for an increased role of local strongmen.⁴

Sidel has the same opinion about local strongmen, but the position of these local strongmen is transformed into local bosses who control important positions to gain monopoly control over the community through the control of economic resources and coercive power in their territorial jurisdiction in democratic era.⁵ This local bossism has the form of governors, mayors, members of the legislature and members of the senate who become brokers. Mastery of these positions makes the local boss's control ability dependent on state-owned resources.⁶ Furthermore, Sidel explained that local bosses emerged through a competitive and periodic election mechanism, in which they used strategies from vote buying, manipulation, to violence.⁷

The use of the theory of local strongmen and bossism in this study is used to analyze the phenomenon of the widespread practice of dynastic politics in every election process, both legislative and regional elections, especially in the 2020 Pilkada where the practice of dynastic politics is increasing.

2.3 Dynastic Politics

The concept of dynastic politics can be seen from the culture of familism. Wasisto Raharjo Djati quoted Garzon's opinion as saying that familism is a political culture which is defined as too much dependence on family ties, which gives birth to the habit of placing family and kinship ties in a higher position than other social obligations. Familism is also defined as a new social order, which is a psychological impetus for someone to be able to have a career in two domains, namely the public as a bureaucrat and the private as a corporate-private.⁸

³ Joel S. Migdal, *State in Society*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) p 88-93

⁴ Joel Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State Society Relations and State Capabilities in The Third World*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988, p 24-33

⁵ John T. Sidel, *Capital, Coercion and Crime: Bossism in the Philippines*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999, p 19-22

⁶ John T Sidel, Philippine in Town, District and Province : Bossism in Cavite and Cebu, dalam *Journal of Asian Studies*, Volume 56 Nomor 4 (November 1997) p 952

⁷ Op.Cit, Sidel.

⁸ Wasisto Raharjo Djati, *Revivalisme Kekuatan Familisme dalam Demokrasi Dinasti Politik di Aras Lokal*, *Jurnal Sosiologi Masyarakat*, Vol. 19, No. 2, Juli 2013, p 208.

There are three cultural concepts of familism, namely first, dynasty familism. Wasisto quoted Garzon's opinion that the familial dynasty was a dynasty built on pure blood relations or through a marriage with another family. For a weaker political family, the position will be advantageous with a stronger political family because it will guarantee the existence of the weak political family. The formation of a political dynasty in the form of familism is usually based on clans to maintain the political privileges that have been obtained. Three important points that influence the pattern of this political dynasty are loyalty, obedience, and family solidarity. The pattern is then linked through the command of elder brothers to younger brothers in government.⁹

The second is quasi-familism. Wasisto quoted Park's opinion as saying that this model is based on the attitude of affection and solidarity of family members in the power structure. The affection which is meant literally is not interpreted as affection, but as a form of family political orientation based on regionalism, environment, and tribalism similar to that of the family. The dimension of this political dynasty is no longer in the realm of the nuclear family, but has also branched out with other families who are not of the same blood line, but have an artificially based kinship system. Therefore, in the quasi-familism model, all family members try to identify themselves through certain symbols in order to gain legitimacy from other families. The identification process can be through the use of family names, marriage lines, or other family rites. So, in quasi-familialism itself, what is fostered is a process of solidarity for its members both in the formal and informal spheres. This is what makes quasi-familism develop like an oligarchic political force capable of exerting influence in all walks of life.¹⁰

The third is familial egoism. Wasisto quoted Park's opinion as saying that this model of political dynasty is based on fulfilling functionalism aspects rather than just following lineage or blood ties. The context of this egoism can be understood in two ways, namely in terms of the regional head and the community. The egoism of the regional head is basically the same as the previous theoretical conception, namely the tendency to prioritize the family over the public in filling public office positions and government succession. The replaced regional head still has influence on his successor, either directly or indirectly, giving rise to the interpretation that there is a shadow government carried out by the demissionary regional head over his successor. This is done with the aim of securing the policy programs and budgeting processes that have been carried out.¹¹

3. RESEARCH METHODS/METHODOLOGY

This research adopted qualitative research. The main method uses in this research are literature study to obtain the objective results. The data were collected with legal procedure which is helped by the committee of election. Literature study towards some journals, scientific papers, newspapers and other sources which are further analyzed by the researcher. This research use theory of local strongmen and local bossism, political dynasty and political recruitment.

⁹ Ibid p 209

¹⁰ Ibid p 210

¹¹ Ibid p 211

4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

4.1 Local Strongmen in Indonesia

The issuance of Law No. 32 of 2004 which was preceded by Law No. 22 of 1999 is an important milestone for Indonesia. These two laws have changed the previously centralized local government system to a decentralized one. In fact, the direct election of regional heads comes from the law. Previously, for approximately 25 years, Indonesia implemented Law No. 5/1974 as the legal basis for implementing regional government. Then, after the reform, Law No. 22/1999 on regional government was issued, which was the initial milestone of reform.

The implementation of decentralization or the regional autonomy system then continued to experience significant development with the enactment of Law No. 32 of 2004 concerning Regional Government. The law implicitly regulates the duties and authorities of the Regional Government. In addition, the law is also considered to strengthen the role of local political actors in Indonesia, but unfortunately this strengthening is not balanced with their role in realizing the consolidation of democracy in the regions. Not a few of the local political elites who take advantage of their positions to perpetuate their power, both in the executive and legislative fields in the regions.¹²

The regime changes from the New Order to the reform era did not necessarily encourage the realization of democratization in Indonesia. The shift from centralized to decentralized is considered to actually encourage the formation of small kings in the regions. The post-reform phenomenon resembles a bandit system, in which political and economic control shifts from big bandits (strategically bandits) to small bandits (roving bandits).¹³ This phenomenon by John T Sidel is called local bossism (local boss), while by Migdal it is called local strongmen.

The emergence of the phenomenon of local strongmen occurred in various regions in Indonesia after the reformation, precisely after the implementation of regional autonomy. This is because, the figure of local people in Indonesia developed along with the transfer of power from the center to the regions (decentralization), this was rarely found in the previous era because the style of government was managed centrally or centralized. Decentralization is used by some local elites to build political and economic oligarchy, thus giving rise to bossism and local strongmen in the regions. Furthermore, the era of decentralization has also opened up space for fighting between elites in regions with various backgrounds and identities to compete for economic and political resources at the local level. According to Hadiz, the struggle does not only involve the struggle for the position of regional head but also the struggle for control over authority and economic resources.¹⁴

The phenomenon of Ratu Atut Choisyah's at local election of Banten Province which was backed up by the Jawara is one form of the phenomenon of local strongmen in Indonesia. This is because Atut's victory was used as political capital by the Jawara

¹² Edward Aspinall dan Marcus Mietzner, *Problem of Democratisation in Indonesia: Elections, Institutions and Society*, (Singapura:ISEAS,2010), p 7

¹³ Eka Suaib dan La Husen Zuada, *Fenomena Bosisme Lokal di Era Desentralisasi: Studi Hegemoni Politik Nur Alam di Sulawesi Tenggara*, (Jurnal Penelitian Politik, Volume 12 No 2 Desember 2015) p 52

¹⁴ Vedi R Hadiz, *Dinamika Politik Indonesia Pasca Soeharto*, (Jakarta:LP3ES, 2005), p 292

figures to control economic and political resources in Banten Province.¹⁵ In Banten, the emergence of local strongmen came from the Jawara, in Polewali Mandar the emergence of local bosses came from among the nobility,¹⁶ while in Bangkalan, Madura, the phenomenon of Fuad Amin's figure as a local boss came from among the santri. The phenomenon of the emergence of local strongmen is increasing and strengthening as the people's permissive attitude opens to the phenomenon of dynastic politics in Indonesia.

4.2 Dynastic Politics in Local Election

The process of direct local election also has an impact on the emergence of dynastic politics and local elites in the regions. The people as the main role holders in the process of electing regional heads will certainly choose a figure they know or know. It's too naive if in the nomination, political parties will nominate figures who have no electability potential at all. Usually, the figures who have the potential for electability come from dynastic political groups. In the 2020 local election, there were 124 regional head candidates with dynastic political backgrounds.

In fact, efforts to prevent the existence of dynastic politics have been designed through Article 7 letter r of Law Number 8 of 2015 concerning Amendments to Law Number 1 of 2015 concerning the Election of Governors, Regents and Mayors which reads "Prospective governors, regent candidates, and mayoral candidates along with their respective deputy candidates. "Each one must not have a conflict of interest with the incumbent". This effort is intended to lock the dynastic political space so that it does not thrive in Indonesia. However, the article was annulled by the Constitutional Court through decision No. 33/PUU-XIII/2015 which stated that article 7 letter r of Law Number 8 of 2015 was unconstitutional because it hindered the constitutional rights of citizens to be elected.

After the Constitutional Court's decision, the number of dynastic politics in the local election contestation has increased. Since the implementation of the first direct elections in 2005 to 2014, there were 59 candidates for regional heads who came from kinship politics or dynastic politics. Then in the simultaneous regional elections from 2015 to 2018, the number of regional head candidates from dynastic politics was 86 candidates. In the 2020 local election, the number of regional head candidates indicated to be from dynastic politics is increasing. It was recorded in the 2020 local election, which was attended by 270 regions in Indonesia, with a total 687 regional head candidates, 124 of whom were regional head candidates who had political kinship with the authorities. Of the 124 candidates for regional heads, the distribution is as follows:

Table 1.1 Distribution of Candidates of dynastic political affiliations

Candidates	Total	Win
Candidate for regent and vice regent	87	39
Candidate for mayoral and vice mayor	28	9
Candidate for	9	3

¹⁵ Lili Romli, *Jawara dan Penguasaan Politik Lokal di Provinsi Banten (2001-2006)*, (Disertasi, Doktor Ilmu Politik UI, Jakarta, 2007)

¹⁶ Roberto Salu Situru, *Bosisme Lokal di Era Desentralisasi, Studi kasus Kepemimpinan Muhammad Andi Ali Baal Masdar di Kabupaten Polewali Mandar, tahun 2004-2014*, (Tesis, Magister Ilmu Politik UI, Jakarta, 2014) p 7

Governor and vice governor		
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Data is processed by various sources

If seen from the table above, it can be seen that the number of wins for regional head candidate pairs affiliated with dynastic politics is not more than the regional head candidate pairs who lost. However, this cannot be simply ignored. The increasing number of pairs of candidates affiliated with dynastic politics is a form of democratic decline, especially if the pairs affiliated with dynastic politics beat other pairs of candidates who are more competent.

Among the pairs of candidates who are affiliated with dynastic politics and who won the local election contestation are the first son of President Joko Widodo, namely the candidate pair Gibran Rakabuming Raka - Teguh Prakosa who won the Surakarta City Election contestation. The Gibran-Teguh pair are supported by nine major parties, namely PDI P, Golkar Party, National Mandate Party (PAN), Gerindra Party, National Justice Party, Democratic Party, United Development Party (PPP), Perindo Party, and National Democratic Party (Nasdem). Meanwhile, his opponents, namely Bagyo Wahyono and FX Supardjo, advanced through an independent path. The pair Gibran Rakabuming – Teguh won the local election with 225,326 votes or around 86.13% of the vote. Meanwhile, its competitors received 36,298 votes or around 13.87 votes.

The victory of the candidate pair Gibran Rakabuming - Teguh Prakosa in the 2020 Surakarta City Election was predicted. This is evidenced by various research results from survey institutions at both local and national levels. Even though it was carried by nine major parties, the pair's victory could not be separated from the popularity of Gibran Rakabuming, the son of the President of the Republic of Indonesia, Joko Widodo, who previously also served as Mayor of Surakarta for two periods. Meanwhile, Teguh Prakosa, who is a candidate for vice Mayor of Surakarta, is the chairman of the Surakarta City DPRD who is promoted by the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI P). The rival candidate of Gibran Rakabuming - Teguh Prakosa namely Bagyo Wahyono - FX Supardjo advanced through the individual route with a background of tailor and former head of RW in Surakarta. When viewed from the political map, the competition between the two pairs of candidates looks unbalanced, apart from the strong support from political parties for the Gibran Rakabuming - Teguh Prakosa pair, of course, the figure and popularity of President Joko Widodo cannot be negated in their victory.

Another pair of candidates who are considered to be affiliated with dynastic politics is the candidate pair for Mayor of Medan, namely Bobby Afif Nasution and Aulia Rachman. Bobby Afif Nasution is the son-in-law of President Joko Widodo. Meanwhile, Aulia Rachman is a member of the Medan City DPRD which is promoted by the Gerindra Party. The pair Bobby afif Nasution - Aulia Rachman was supported by nine supporting parties namely the PDI-P, Gerindra Party, National Mandate Party (PAN), Golkar Party, National Democratic Party (NasDem Party), Indonesian Solidarity Party (PSI), Hanura Party and the United Development Party. (PPP). Meanwhile, his competitor, Akhyar Nasution - Salman Alfarisi, is supported by two political parties, namely the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) and the Democratic Party. In the contest, the pair Bobby Afif Nasution - Aulia Rachman was able to beat their competitor who is the incumbent candidate with a total of 393,533 votes or around 53.5%. While the incumbent candidate pair got as many as 342,480 votes or around 46.5% of the vote.

When viewed from the background of the two pairs of candidates for Mayor of Medan City, the pair Akhyar Nasution - Salman Alfarisi are quite experienced in the political practice. Akhyar is the incumbent candidate, while Salman Alfarisi is the Deputy/vice Chairman of the DPRD for North Sumatra Province. Meanwhile, the couple Bobby Nasution - Aulia Rahman can be said to be newcomers in politics. Bobby Nasution was previously a businessman, his name became known to the public after he married the daughter of President Joko Widodo. Meanwhile, although Aulia Rachman has a

background as a member of the Medan City DPRD, it is known that He only took office in 2019. The victory of the candidate pair Bobby Nasution - Aulia Rahman certainly cannot be separated from Bobby Nasution's image as President Joko Widodo's son-in-law in addition to the support from nine coalition political parties.

In addition to the two pairs of candidates above, who are sons and daughters-in-law of national figures, President Joko Widodo, the phenomenon of dynastic politics in the 2020 local election also occurred in several areas affiliated with dynastic politics with local strongmen in the local level (regions). One of them is the candidate pair for Regent and Deputy Regent of Ogan Ilir Regency, namely Panca Wijaya Akbar - Ardani. Panca Wijaya Akbar is the son of the Vice Governor of South Sumatra, Mawardi Yahya, who was previously the Regent of Ogan Ilir for two periods, and the nephew of Mayor Prabumulih Ridho Yahya. Previously, Panca Wijaya Akbar's older brother, Ahmad Wazir Noviadi, was the Regent of Ogan Ilir Regency based on the results of the 2015 Ogan Ilir election. But, Ahmad Wazir Noviadi had to be dismissed from his position because of the drug case that ensnared him. The position of Ahmad Wazir Noviadi was then replaced by his vice regent, Ilyas Panji Alam, who later in the 2020 election became a competitor of Panca Wijaya Akbar - Ardani.

The candidate pair for Regent and Deputy Regent Panca Wijaya Akbar - Ardani was promoted by nine supporting parties, namely the Democratic Party, the United Development Party (PPP), the Democratic National Party, the National Mandate Party (PAN), the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), the National Awakening Party (PKB), Gerindra Party, Berkarya Party and Perindo Party. While the competitors, namely the candidate pair Ilyas Panji Alam - Endang PU Ishak, were promoted by the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI P), the Golkar Party and the Crescent Star Party (PBB). In the 2020 Ogan Ilir local election, there were several crucial events including the Panca – Ardani candidate pair reporting their competitors to Bawaslu on charges of abuse of power in distributing social assistance and attending Karang Taruna events in their capacity as regional heads who will run again in the Pilkada. Against this report, the KPU and Bawaslu of Ogan Ilir Regency annulled the candidacy of the candidate pair Ilyas Panji Alam - Endang PU Ishak. However, the pair made an appeal to the Supreme Court with the result that the Supreme Court restored the constitutional rights of the candidate pair Ilyas Panji Alam-Endang PU Ishak. Thus, the Regional Head Election of Ogan Ilir Regency was held again with two pairs of candidates.

Based on the real count results from the KPU of Ogan Ilir Regency, the candidate pair Panca Wijaya Akbar – Ardani was declared the winner in the local election with 149,791 votes or around 63.8% of the votes. Meanwhile, the incumbent candidate Ilyas Panji Alam – Endang PU Ishak got 84,983 votes or around 36.2%. The victory of the candidate pair Panca Wijaya Akbar - Ardani who managed to defeat the incumbent candidate with a fairly landslide vote, certainly cannot be separated from the political background of Panca Wijaya-Ardani. Apart from being the son of the Vice Governor of South Sumatra Province, Panca Wijaya is the grandson of the first sub-district head of Ogan Ilir, whom the local community considers Panca's father and grandfather to be instrumental in the development of Ogan Ilir. This was reinforced by various campaign props for the candidate pair Panca Wijaya – Ardani which included photos of his father and brother on billboards or campaign banners. Despite not having a previous background in politics, the people of Ogan Ilir believe that with the guidance of his father and brother, Panca will become a capable regional head.

“Although many doubt that because he is young and has no experience in politics, we believe that Panca-Ardani can bring Ogan Ilir to life with the guidance of his father and brother.”¹⁷

The victory of the Panca Wijaya Akbar - Ardani was also influenced by media framing

¹⁷ Interview with one of voters of local election at Ogan Ilir, December 9th 2020

of the performance of incumbent Ilyas Panji Alam during his tenure as Regent of Ogan Ilir Regency. The media framing included, Regent Ilyas Panji Alam dismissing hundreds of health worker in Ogan Ilir Regency at the beginning of the covid 19 pandemic, handing over social assistance from the government with a cover photo of Ilyas Panji Alam, Ilyas Panji Alam holding a press conference when he was tested positive for Covid 19 and various framing other media.

Another pair of candidates who are also affiliated with other local political forces is the candidate pair Benjamin Davnie - Pilar Saga Ichsan who is a candidate for Mayor and Deputy Mayor of South Tangerang. As is known, Pilar Saga Ichsan is the son of the Regent of Serang, Ratu Tatu Chasanah, who is still a political clan with Ratu Atut Choisyah. Meanwhile, Benyamin Davnie is the incumbent candidate who was previously the vice Mayor of South Tangerang, the representative of Airin Rachmi Diany who is also the sister-in-law of Ratu Atut Choisyah. The unique thing about the 2020 South Tangerang City local election is that the local election is followed by three pairs of candidates, all three of whom are affiliated with dynastic politics. The three pairs, namely Muhammad - Rahayu Saraswati, were promoted by five political parties, namely the Gerindra Party, PDI-P, the Indonesian Solidarity Party (PSI), the National Mandate Party (PAN) and the Hanura Party. Rahayu Saraswati is a member of the Indonesian House of Representatives who is also the nephew of Prabowo Subianto. The next pair is Siti Nurazizah - Ruhamben who is promoted by the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), the Democratic Party and the National Awakening Party (PKB). Siti Nurazizah is the daughter of the Vice President of the Republic of Indonesia, KH. Ma'ruf Amin. Based on the real count results from the KPU of South Tangerang City, the candidate pair Benjamin - Pilar Saga won the South Tangerang City local Election with 235,734 votes or around 40%. The Muhammad – Rahayu pair got 205,309 votes and the Siti Nurazizah – Ruhamben pair got 134,682 valid votes.

Based on the description above, it can be concluded that the phenomenon of dynastic politics is and will continue to be a reality in every election and regional election contestation in Indonesia. The rise of dynastic politics in the election contestation will also have an impact on strengthening the hegemony of local strongmen in the region. This can be seen from the increasing number of regional heads and former regional heads who have started to build their political dynasties. The phenomenon of the strengthening of dynastic politics is not only caused by the permissive nature of society towards dynastic politics but is also caused by a political recruitment process that is not based on a merit system. The strengthening of the political network built by political dynasties based on family political affinity led to the closure of political recruitment outside the dynasty. As explained by Turner that a network has an important influence on the dynamics of the transition of political power which has an impact on the closure of political recruitment. This can be seen from the recruitment process of political parties for candidate pairs in the local election, most of the candidate pairs affiliated with dynastic politics are carried by a coalition of "fat" parties and these pairs usually do not come from the cadre of political parties that have been prepared in advance.

CONCLUSION

The phenomenon of dynastic politics that characterizes the contestation of elections and local elections in Indonesia is caused by various factors, including the permissive attitude of the people towards the widespread practice of dynastic politics in Indonesia, minimal political education, the absence of strict regulations related to dynastic political practices and the political recruitment process that is not effective. open. The phenomenon of dynastic politics that occurred in Indonesia also greatly influenced the strengthening of local strongmen in the regions.

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